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1. Summary  
Social safety nets in fragile and conflict-affected states often include cash and in-kind transfers, 
school feeding programmes and public works programmes (O’Brien, Scott, Smith, Barca, 
Karden, Holmes, Watson & Congrave, 2018). Programmes often target vulnerable households, 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in order to reduce their exposure to shocks and 
recourse to negative coping strategies, and to strengthen social cohesion (see for example, Al-
Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018). In protracted crises, humanitarian actors frequently use social safety 
net approaches and there is overlap between humanitarian assistance and social protection 
(O’Brien et al., 2018). In addition to safety nets, social protection programmes in fragile and 
conflict-affected states can also target government institutions, building the government’s 
capacity to deliver longer-term social protection programmes.  
The country examples presented in this review illustrate that even if government-led social 
protection programmes exist, for example national cash transfer programmes, fragility and 
conflict affects and can destroy their ability to function. For example, Yemen’s Social Welfare 
Fund delivered cash transfers to 1.5 million households until early 20151. Pre-existing national 
programmes and systems can be useful to donors and implementing agencies delivering social 
protection even if they are not functioning. For example, pre-existing beneficiary lists can make 
beneficiary targeting easier.  
However, weak institutions, low institutional and absorptive capacity and damaged infrastructure 
can pose implementation challenges (Holmes, 2010, p. 4). For example, limited government 
ownership of a World Bank financed project to improve pension administration in Afghanistan 
slowed the project’s progress (World Bank, 2018b, p. 23). Humanitarian responses often create 
new emergency structures as national or local institutions are not able to respond a crisis (Al-
Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 23). However, in Iraq, this may have led to duplication as both the 
Iraqi government and humanitarian agencies were providing cash transfers to IDPs (Smart, 
2017).  
Selected insights from the evidence on fragile and conflict-affected states includes:  
 Social safety nets and social protection programmes are often donor funded and 
implemented by UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); the linkages 
between implementing agencies and government institutions vary from programmes that 
operate in parallel, to those that ‘piggyback’ on elements of pre-existing systems and 
those that seek to build and strength government systems. Programmes that work with 
government systems may have the goal of transferring ownership to the government (see 
for example section 3 on Afghanistan); 
 Large-scale programmes include World Food Programme interventions (e.g. food 
assistance, cash transfers and public works in South Sudan) and a UNICEF/World Bank 
emergency cash transfer programme in Yemen, which replaces a pre-existing 
government-led scheme;  
 Small-scale interventions include UNICEF’s cash transfer for children with disabilities in 
Syria and pilot projects in Afghanistan;  
                                                   
1 Accessed 8 November 2018: http://sp-fragility-displacement.onetec.eu/docs/Country%20Profile%20-
%20Yemen.pdf 
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 Project results, including beneficiary numbers are readily available, however, evidence of 
long-term impact or impact on goals such as educational attainment or improved food 
security are less readily available. It is difficult to conduct programme evaluations in 
fragile and conflict-affected countries as it may not be possible to access beneficiaries 
due to insecurity or to track beneficiaries due to high levels of internal displacement 
(Aurino, Tranchant, Diallo & Gelli, 2018, p. 15); 
 Returnees and IDPs face barriers in accessing social protection, for example, in 
Afghanistan returnee children have struggled to access the school system due to 
problems with having their school certificates recognised (UNHCR, 2018);  
 Security concerns can affect the scale and reach of social protection programmes, for 
example, in Sudan it is hard to reach IDPs in non-government controlled areas 
(UNOCHA, 2018); 
 Humanitarian agencies often work with host communities as well as IDPs in order to 
promote social cohesion; 
 Gender sensitive programming is important as women can face barriers accessing social 
protection, for example, women in Afghanistan cannot travel far from their villages, which 
could hinder their ability to attend registration centres (World Bank, 2018b). The World 
Bank’s funded cash transfer programme also had gendered impacts on food security: 
male food security increased, but women’s did not. Cash-based programmes do not 
necessarily have impacts on gender norms or roles or equality (see for example, 
UNHCR, 2018); 
 Donor harmonisation can also be a problem, for example, in Iraq, until recently, there 
was no agreed cash transfer amount amongst implementing agencies. 
The evidence base on social protection in fragile and conflict-affected states, particularly in 
relation to provision and policy/programme impacts is generally weak (Slater, Mallet & Carpenter, 
2012, p. 1). For example, knowledge gaps include the evidence of social protection on children’s 
education, including whether effects vary by type of programme, child gender or degree of 
conflict intensity (Aurino at al., 2018, p. 3)2. This lack of evidence critically hinders the design of 
context and child sensitive responses that can promote the accumulation of human capital, 
particularly in situations of protracted fragility (Aurino et al., 2018, p. 3). In terms of displacement, 
there is lots of information on programmes working with refugees, for example, Syrian refugees 
in Jordan. During the course of this review only limited evidence was found of programmes 
addressing the needs of returnees to fragile and conflict-affected states. IDPs are included in a 
number of the social protection programmes outlined in the review. In selecting examples, this 
review largely focused on states that are included in DFID’s high fragility category3.  
                                                   
2 For example, conflict is likely to increase the opportunity cost of education as child labour is a common coping 
strategy in the face of conflict-related shocks (Aurino et al., 2018, p. 8). 
3 Accessed 8 November 2018: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/722389/Metho
dology-Note-Fragile-and-conflict-affected-states-and-regions.pdf 
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2. Social safety nets  
Social protection is “is the set of public actions that address the deprivation and vulnerabilities of 
the poorest, and the need of the currently non-poor for security in the face of shocks and the 
particular demands of different stages of the life cycle” (O’Brien et al., 2018). ‘Safety nets’ are a 
form of social protection which help people meet immediate basic needs in times of crisis, with 
the short-term goals of mitigating the immediate impact of shocks and smoothing consumption 
(Browne, 2015). Common social safety nets in fragile and crisis-affected states include 
unconditional cash transfers, conditional transfers (e.g. beneficiaries must comply with certain 
conditions such as sending their children to school or attending a health centre), school feeding 
programmes, and in-kind transfers (food, shelter, agricultural inputs). The World Bank (2018) has 
a wider definition of safety nets that conceptualises them in terms of social assistance 
programme. As such, they also include social pensions, public works programmes, and fee 
waivers and targeted subsidies (World Bank, 2018).  
During the course of this review, the World Bank, UNICEF, WFP and others were found to be 
actively supporting or implementing social protection programmes in fragile and conflict-affected 
states. For example, in South Sudan, all social safety net programming consists of World Food 
Programme (WFP) financed and implemented programmes (World Bank, 2018, p. 3). The WFP 
uses both in-kind transfers (general food distribution, blanket supplementary feeding 
programmes and targeted supplementary feeding programmes for internally displaced persons 
and returnees) and Food Assistance for Assets projects (a public works programme) (World 
Bank, 2018; WFP, 2018).  
Social protection in fragile and conflict-affected states 
Delivering social protection in fragile states is hugely difficult (Harvey et al., 2007). Long-term 
government-led safety nets are rarely in place in fragile and conflict-affected countries (Holmes, 
2010, p. 4). In countries where social safety nets were in place pre-crisis, for example in Nepal 
and Tajikistan, the impact of conflict limits and can destroy the delivery of interventions (Holmes, 
2010, p. 4). Social protection programmes can play an important role in fragile and conflict-
affected states: for example, public works programmes can provide an income and reduce the 
use of harmful coping mechanisms such as selling assets and removing children from school (Al-
Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 19). 
Challenges for implementing social protection programmes include weak institutions, low 
institutional and absorptive capacity and damaged infrastructure (Holmes, 2010, p. 4). 
Expenditure on social protection as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is low in 
conflict-affected countries (Slater, Mallet & Carpenter, 2012, p. 2). Particularly in Africa, 
government delivered or managed social assistance is highly constrained, with international 
agencies dominating instead (Slater, Mallet & Carpenter, 2012, p. 2). Assistance is often small-
scale, limited in coverage and funded via short-term or humanitarian budget lines (Slater, Mallet 
& Carpenter, 2012, p. 2). Government-led social protection is more developed in South Asia, 
however, it is often hampered by problems including low coverage, low transfer value, elite 
control of access and lack of coordination (Slater, Mallet & Carpenter, 2012, p. 2).  
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Trends 
The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO, 2016) argue that within social protection 
programmes in fragile and risk-prone contexts there has been a shift towards cash-based 
programming to provide safety nets. For example, in fragile and humanitarian contexts where 
social protection structures are not in place, but markets continue to function (FAO, 2016, p. 4). 
The benefits of cash transfers include minimising recourse to negative coping strategies, allowing 
families to reduce their exposure to hazards, promoting public works programmes to create and 
rehabilitate infrastructure, and in the context of forced displacement, strengthen the capacity of 
host communities to tolerate additional strain on resources (FAO, 2016, p. 1). However, 
according to the FAO (2016, p. 4) more needs to be done enhance the potential of cash-based 
interventions including strengthening partnerships with financial institutions and mobile phone 
companies, using e-payments, digital transfers and where possible leveraging cash transfers to 
build medium and long-term social assistance structures that can be used in recurrent 
emergencies. FAO (2016, p. 5) have developed CASH+ interventions which combine transfers of 
cash and productive in-kind assets.  
Within the literature there is also increasing attention to building risk-informed and shock-
responsive social protection systems (see for example, FAO, 2016). A recent research 
programme, the Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems study (2015-2018) aimed to 
strengthen the evidence base as to when and how social protection systems could better 
respond to shocks in low-income countries and fragile and conflict-affected states (O’Brien, 
Scott, Smith, Barca, Karden, Holmes, Watson & Congrave, 2018). The programme identified five 
key options for shock-responsive adaption:  
 design tweaks (making small adjustments to a routine social protection programme);  
 piggybacking (where an emergency response uses an established system or programme 
to deliver something new);  
 vertical expansion (temporary increase of the value or duration of an intervention to meet 
beneficiaries additional needs); 
 horizontal expansion (temporary inclusion of a new caseload e.g. enrolling more 
households) 
 alignment (designing an intervention with elements resembling others that already exist 
or are planned, but without integrating the two) (O’Brien et al., 2018). 
There is considerable evidence to show that across countries, people regularly pursue informal 
social protection in order to mitigate the risks they face (Slater, Mallet & Carpenter, 2012, p. 2). 
For example, available longitudinal data from Afghanistan illustrates that surveyed urban 
households largely had strong social networks from which they borrowed: effectively their only 
source of social protection (Pain, 2012). Formal social protection, i.e. provided by the state or 
other agencies is limited in Afghanistan (Pain, 2012).   
Case study: Education 
A 2010 background paper prepared for UNESCO examined the role of social protection 
programmes in supporting education in conflict-affected contexts, drawing on existing literature 
(Holmes, 2010). Experience suggests that education subsidies and fee waivers offer important 
potential to offset costs and increase enrolment and attendance, but have not been widely 
implemented (Holmes, 2010, p. iv). The direct and indirect costs of schooling to families often 
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represent the single most important factor excluding children from poor households from school 
in fragile and conflict-affected settings (Holmes, 2010, p. 1). The paper argues that long-term 
funding, institutional coordination and support for capacity building are needed to deliver 
sustainable social protection at scale, which supports households to meet both the direct and 
indirect costs of education in conflict-affected countries (Holmes, 2010, p. iv).  
In situations where families and communities are chronically displaced as a result of localised, 
ongoing conflict, even if schools exist, children may not be able to enrol because they lack the 
correct documentation or the school fees (Holmes, 2010, p. 5). Public works programmes can 
achieve the dual goals of building school infrastructure and increasing school attendance as 
wages paid in cash are used for school fees, but, a concern remains about the quality of 
education as well as adequate staffing and school resources (Holmes, 2010, p. 5).  
School feeding programmes are one of the most common social protection initiatives and offer a 
free meal, snack or take-home ration to attending children with the general goals of promoting 
education and health, and programme goals in conflict-affected settings including child 
protection, safety and normalcy (Holmes, 2010, p. 5; Aurino et. al., 2018, p. 5). Programmes are 
normally supported by donors and implemented by NGOs or UN agencies, reaching larger 
number numbers than other social protection initiatives (Holmes, 2010, p. 5). For example, within 
a year of the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the World Food Programme was feeding 
350,000 schoolchildren (however, the 2001/2 school-age population was 3.4 million) (Holmes, 
2010, p. 5). However, evidence of school feeding programmes’ impact on school enrolment, 
attendance and attainment is mixed (Holmes, 2010, p. 6).    
In transitional contexts, school feeding can be used to assist restoration of education systems, 
encourage the return of IDPs and promote social cohesion amongst children (Aurino et al., 2018, 
p. 5). School feeding may not be a viable solution in high-intensity conflict areas where schools 
are closed or other operational constraints impede effective implementation (Aurino et al., 2018, 
p. 6). Fear and insecurity may constitute additional barriers in conflict settings, for example, girls 
may be kept out of school due to fears that girls are more likely to be targets of violence (Aurino 
et al., 2018, p. 7).  
Recommendations from the literature  
The Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) is an eight-year global research 
programme exploring livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict-affected 
situations4. A 2017 Briefing Paper based on findings from a three-year research programme into 
how people make a living in rural Afghanistan and the role played by the government, aid 
agencies, markets and donors, includes a number of recommendations, including: 
 Urgent attention is required to address the immediate needs of a deeply impoverished 
rural population, many of whom are food insecure, without decent work and without the 
means in the near future to be able to secure it. Direct cash transfers would need to be 
context specific, for example, transfers to women may be possible if appropriately framed 
as a family payment or child welfare payment. However, in some regions this would be 
seen as deeply subversive (Pain, Jackson, Huot & Minoia, 2017, p. 4).  
                                                   
4 Accessed 5 November 2018: https://securelivelihoods.org/who-we-are/ 
7 
 Long term decent job creation is more likely to lie in the urban than the rural economy. 
However it is difficult to see under current circumstances how this will come about. In the 
short term focused labour intensive rural infrastructure and urban public work 
programmes could do much to address the acute need for work and income of 
Afghanistan’s rural population (Pain, Jackson, Huot & Minoia, 2017, p. 5).  
  Both cash transfers and employment schemes would need to be based “on a careful 
analysis of context to take account of the ability of local power holders to control and 
capture external resources” (Pain, Jackson, Huot & Minoia, 2017, p. 4).  
A 2012 SLRC briefing paper on social protection in conflict-affected settings recommends: 
 Conflict-sensitive programmes approaches: it is important to deliver social protection 
programmes in a way that do not inadvertently contribute to conflict; 
 Build on what is there, i.e. on the resilience of people and communities: there is 
substantial evidence that individuals, households and communities use their own 
resources and intiative to access basic services (Slater, Mallet & Carpenter, 2012, p. 4). 
Holmes (2010, p. 10) argues that four important considerations to take into account when 
designing social protection programmes in conflict-affected areas are the type of social protection 
intervention, targeting, length and amount of cash transfers and the existence of complementary 
activities. For example, seed distribution, livestock restocking, and skills training.  
3. Social safety nets examples from Afghanistan 
The World Bank: Pension Administration and Safety Net Project 
Running from 2010 to end of 2017, the project’s aims were: 
 improving the administration of the public pension scheme; 
 develop administrative systems for safety net interventions, with a focus on targeting and 
benefit payment delivery,  
 Cash benefits to the poorest families in four pilot districts as a first step in developing a 
sustainable approach to safety nets in Afghanistan (World Bank, 2018b, p. 1, p. 6).  
Pension Administration 
The Government of Afghanistan supports two pension schemes, spending approximately 0.5% of 
GDP on each scheme in 2009 (World Bank, 2018b, p. 5). In 2009, the Public Sector Pension had 
approximately 60,000 registered public sector employees and uniformed members of the police 
and military; the Martyrs and Disabled Pension had approximately 220,000 survivors of the 
conflicts and 90,000 persons with disabilities (World Bank, 2018b, p. 5). The Pensions 
Department of the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) 
administers both schemes (World Bank, 2018b, p. 5).  
Project activities for both programmes included software development and record cleansing and 
verification (the Ministry was originally using a paper-based system and as part of the transition 
pensioners were asked to appear in person as proof of life) (World Bank, 2018b, pp. 34-39). In 
order to provide smooth delivery, the World Bank supported a power generator at the Pensions 
Department, the opening of individual bank accounts for all pensioners and management 
8 
information systems installations in four provinces (Nangarhar, Balkh, Herat and Kandahar) 
(World Bank, 2018b, pp. 34- 39).  
Project results include:  
 114,100 beneficiaries registered in a new electronic management information system for 
the public sector pension programme against a revised target of 85,000; 
 0 beneficiaries registered in a new electronic management system for the martyrs and 
disabled pension programme (the World Bank has continued to support this transition 
and there were 3,000 beneficiaries registered by May 2018); 
 Development of an operational manual for the Pensions Department; training for 88 
Pension Department staff in how to implement new rules/procedures against a target of 
50; and, pension eligibility verification and recertification procedures defined and applied 
(World Bank, 2018b, pp. 25-28). 
Safety net pilot programme 
Project activities included developing administrative systems, designing and implementing a 
targeting process, and delivering targeted benefit payments (including payment service 
provider’s fees and facilitating partners services) (World Bank, 2018b, p. 9). The World Bank 
aimed to develop scalable systems for delivering social protection (World Bank, 2018b, p. 54). 
For beneficiaries the intended outcomes included smoothing food consumption, increasing food 
security and reducing reliance on harmful coping mechanisms through seasonal shocks (World 
Bank, 2018b, p. 54).  
During the pilot phase (2010 to 2013), a one-off cash transfer of between USD 40 and USD 200 
(depending on the number of dependents in the household) was issued as a manual payment 
during the lean winter season (World Bank, 2018b, p. 42). Beneficiaries were selected from a 
pool of 70,000 families who had registered in the management information system (World Bank, 
2018b, p. 41). 
In the project completion report, the World Bank (2018b, p. 42) stated that the transfer was 
relatively large and could attract elite capture; a one-off payment did not serve as a safety net; 
and manual cash transfers were subject to leakages (World Bank, 2018b, p. 42). During the 
project’s additional financing phase the transfer amount was reduced and two payments were 
issued (one before and one after winter) for two years and e-payment was introduced via bank 
electronic transfer or by mobile phone via two mobile money operators (World Bank, 2018b, p. 
42, p. 39). 
Project results include 
 55% of safety net beneficiaries coming from the poorest 30% against a revised target of 
60% (the original project design did not have a value for this indicator, the 60% target 
was added during the additional financing phase); 
 72% of beneficiaries receiving their payments on time against a revised target of 60%; 
 26,938 families receiving assistance against a 2012 baseline of 16,465 and a revised 
target of 28,000 (World Bank, 2018b, p. 27); 
 4 staff members in a dedicated safety nets unit within the MoLSAMD against a revised 
target of 6 staff (World Bank, 2018b, p. 33).  
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Project evaluation 
The World Bank rated the project’s performance as moderately satisfactory (World Bank, 2018b, 
p. 2). Project implementation challenges included unpredictable and risky security, poor 
accessibility to project areas and weak capacity of government and community institutions 
implementing the project (World Bank, 2018b, p. 5). As part of the additional financing for the 
project in 2013, the Bank envisaged changing the implementation arrangements for the day-to-
day project management from the Project Coordination Unit staffed by consultants to structures 
within the MoLSAMD (World Bank, 2018b, p. 11). However, this was not possible due to a lack of 
capacity in the MoLSAMD (World Bank, 2018b, p. 11).  
An impact evaluation for the safety net component involved a cluster-randomised controlled trial 
comparing a sample group of beneficiaries with a control group (World Bank, 2018b, p. 54). 
Findings from the evaluation include: 
 The transfer improved food security (significant reduction in number of households 
reporting no food in the household in the previous 30 days, and in households reporting 
either any adult male or any male/female child going to bed hungry in the previous 30 
days) but not per capita food consumption;  
 Women’s food security was not affected, which may be due to women’s ensuring 
everyone else’s food security first or men helping themselves first  
 Significant positive effects on the number of households that indicated they had 
recovered from the shocks they had experienced in the last year  
 Increased school attendance for boys aged 6-13 who were enrolled in school, potentially 
due to cash transfers reducing the need for boy child labour in family work. However, 
cash transfers were associated with lower school attendance for girls aged 14-17 
enrolled in school. This raises a point of concern for further investigation (World Bank, 
2018b, pp. 55-57). 
 Higher levels of confidence in public institutions, potentially due to beneficiaries having 
contact with public institutions, which had not previously occurred, or the results could 
reflect a relative decrease in confidence in the control group as a result of not receiving 
transfers during the trial period (World Bank, 2018b, p. 58).  
The project has a number of lessons that are relevant to the implementation of social safety nets 
in fragile and conflict-affected states. Government ownership is critical for project success: the 
implementation of both pension schemes was slowed down due to limited government 
involvement and leadership and the reluctance of Pensions Department staff to engage with the 
project (World Bank, 2018b, p. 23). The Bank argues that in retrospect it would have engaged 
more with midlevel managers and technical staff, responsible for day-to-day project activities 
(World Bank, 2018b, p. 24).  
Barriers to participation need to be removed, for example, the registration process needs to be 
flexible and reach out to those who cannot travel far from their villages including women (World 
Bank, 2018b, p. 24). The delivery of cash through mobile banking services in provinces where 
there were no banking facilities available was successful and future safety net projects, which 
intend to use cash, can build on the experience gained in this project and use the mobile 
payment mechanism (World Bank, 2018b, p. 24). 
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UNICEF: Cash Transfers 
Child sensitive cash transfer 
In 2017, UNICEF discontinued a child sensitive cash transfer pilot project (UNICEF, 2018, p. 57). 
Pilot activities included providing conditional and unconditional transfers of an annual value of 
USD180-250, depending on family size, to comparable, eligible households via e-payment 
mechanisms into beneficiary bank accounts (UNICEF, 2017, p. 55). The targeted caseload was 
18,026 and round one of payment transfers was completed successfully (UNICEF, 2017, p. 55). 
The pilot was implemented by the MoLSAMD, a team of national technical experts was hired and 
the targeting process involved a cohort of social mobilisers (UNICEF, 2017, p. 55). In the long-
term, UNICEF aimed at increasing the scale of interventions with the government taking 
ownership of the system (Samuel Hall, 2014, p. 6). 
Challenges with the pilot included securing funding for sustainability and scale-up, and the 
project’s limited connections to established MoLSAMD social protection mechanisms (UNICEF, 
2018, p. 59). UNICEF is currently working on a lessons learnt, particularly in terms of 
establishing and administering a cash transfer system with MoLSAMD. One of the organisation’s 
2018 priorities is to re-strategise its social protection programme with the Ministry and 
development partners, and identify pathways to reach the most marginalised children (UNICEF, 
2018, p. 57).  
Small cash transfer projects 
As part of its work to improve maternal, neonatal and child health, UNICEF introduced a 
conditional cash transfer for institutional delivery for women (roughly the cost of transport) and 
community health workers (UNICEF, 2018, p. 14). In 2017, 3, 643 post-partum women who gave 
birth in facilities received the cash incentive and 1,260 community workers who referred or 
accompanied a woman also received it (UNICEF, 2018, p. 23).  
In 2018, UNICEF will implement a small cash transfer initiative for the families of out-of-school 
adolescent girls to generate evidence on the effect of cash transfers on increasing secondary 
enrolment rates among girls and reducing the incidence of child marriage (UNICEF, 2018, p. 59).  
Supporting the government to establish social protection systems  
In 2016 and 2017, UNICEF Afghanistan provided technical support to the government to assist it 
in drafting a national social protection policy (UNICEF, 2018, p. 59). In 2018, UNICEF 
Afghanistan will undertake a mapping of the social protection landscape for children to generate 
evidence on the number of children benefitting from existing social protection mechanisms and 
the potential to enhance the child-centred elements (UNICEF, 2018, p. 59).  
In 2017, UNICEF supported a feasibility study, funded by DFID and co-authored with WFP and 
UNHCR to determine the feasibility of various cash-in-emergencies options (UNICEF, 2018, p. 
59). According to UNICEF’S 2017 annual report, the draft is being finalised for submission and 
will serve as a stepping-stone for further discussions regarding future joint United Nations 
initiatives on cash in emergencies and potential partnerships with DFID (UNICEF, 2018, p. 59).  
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4. Social safety nets examples from fragile and conflict-
affected states 
Mali: Educational Impacts of emergency food assistance 
Auronio, Tranchant, Diallo and Gelli’s (2018) working paper analyses the effects of a WFP 
emergency school feeding programme and a WFP general food distribution programme on 
children’s schooling during conflict in Mali. The paper focuses on the impacts of food assistance 
on children’s school enrolment, attendance and attainment in Mopti, central Mail (Aurino et al., 
2018, p. 4). Half of Mali’s population are under 15 years of age and its primary completion and 
literacy rates are amongst the lowest in the world (Aurino et al., 2018, p. 4). 
As part of the school feeding programme, WFP and partners relied on the government’s 
geographical targeting and provided daily hot lunches throughout the school year as an incentive 
for parents to enrol and keep their children in school (Aurino et al., 2018, p. 13). General food 
distribution involves the provision of a food ration, including basics such as cereals and oils to 
vulnerable households in order to help families avoid adopting detrimental coping strategies 
including school dropout and increased child labour (Aurino et al., 2018, pp. 7-8). The literature 
on general food distribution and education is strikingly limited, with the majority of available 
literature focusing on non-conflict situations (Aurino et al., 2018, p. 8).  Unlike school feeding 
programmes, where the school attendance pathway is clear, the links between general food 
distribution and household decisions regarding child schooling are less direct (Aurino et al., 2018, 
p. 9).  
Project results include: 
 Children in the school feeding programme were nearly 11% more likely to be enrolled in 
school; 
 School feeding had a positive effect on grade attainment: treated boys achieved an 
average of more than additional half-year of education compared with comparison peers, 
whilst girls achieved an additional 0.6 years relative to boys; 
 School feeding had no significant effect on absenteeism; 
 School feeding reduced the amount of time girls spent on farming and animal-rearing 
activities; 
 General food distribution did not change enrolment and had a slightly negative effect on 
the grade attained, as well as increasing absenteeism by an average of an additional day 
a week amongst boys  
 General food distribution increased boys participation and time spent in child labour 
(Aurino et al., 2018, p.p. 29-30, pp. 34-35). 
Negative effects on school attendance in the villages receiving general food distribution can be 
largely explained by the intensity of the conflict: general food distribution had no effect on child 
absenteeism in villages where no armed groups were present, but did lead to increased 
absenteeism in communes and villages where armed groups were present (Aurino et al., 2018, 
pp. 32-33). Increases in male child labour were larger in more conflict-affected areas (Aurino et 
al., 2018, p. 35).  
12 
South Sudan: Food Assistance for Assets  
The World Food Programme implements its Food Assistance for Assets programme in a number 
of countries, including in 2017, in the parts of South Sudan, which were experiencing stability 
(WFP, 2018, p. 1). The South Sudanese programme focuses on asset creation activities that 
enhance food availability e.g. crop farms and vegetable gardens, and activities that enhance food 
access, e.g. community access roads. Assets are selected by community members through 
community-based participatory planning processes (WFP, 2018, p. 2).  
Food assistance is provided to participants and their family members to meet short-term food 
needs (WFP, 2018, p. 2). Where markets are functioning a cash-based transfer is issued, where 
markets are non-functioning or access is challenging an in-kind ration is provided (WFP, 2018, p. 
2). The WFP works with government at all levels from the ministries of agriculture down to state, 
county and boma administrators (WFP, 2018, p. 2).  
Project results in 2017 include:  
 450,000 people supported; 
 11,000 metric tonnes of food assistance distributed; 
 USD 4.7 million disbursed in cash based transfers; 
 24, 715 hectares of crop farms and 466 kilometres of roads built; 
 67, 215 people provided with skills development training (WFP, 2018, p. 1).  
In 2018, the programme is being scaled-up to reach almost 630,000 people across all regions of 
the countries (WFP, 2018, p. 1). This partly reflects WFP’s interest in moving away from 
unconditional transfers where possible (WFP, 2018, p. 1).  
Yemen: comparing cash and food transfers 
Schwab’s (2018) working paper for UNICEF’s Office of Research compares the productive 
effects of cash and food transfers in Yemen. The paper studies a food assistance intervention 
implemented by the WFP in rural Yemen in 2011-2012, during insecurity before the full onset of 
the current crisis, which caused the erosion of real incomes and severe price vitality of staple 
goods (Schwab, 2018, p. 4, p. 12). Communities in the study were randomly assigned to receive 
three equal-valued food or cash transfers worth nearly USD 50 each (Schwab, 2018, p. 4).  
These transfers were part of a WFP emergency safety net initiative designed to assist severely 
food insecure households (Schwab, 2018, p. 12).  
Both the cash transfer and the food transfer had modest productive impacts: cash transfers had 
a positive impact on livestock acquisition and food transfers increased the likelihood farming 
households would plant cash crops (Schwab, 2018, p. 5). Both transfer types boosted the 
amount of off-farm wage-work households undertook, but there was no relative difference in 
adult or child labour (Schwab, 2018, p. 4). Impacts on child labour are unclear: transfers do not 
appear to increase child labour, but the timing of the survey impedes its ability to disentangle 
transfers from the effect of the start of the school year (Schwab, 2018, p. 6). Relative to food 
beneficiaries, cash recipients consumed a more diverse diet: this may be due to food recipients 
switching to cash-crop production, so temporarily shifting to a more cereal based diet (Schwab, 
2018, p. 7).  
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Yemen: The World Bank’s Emergency Crisis Response 
As of January 2018, most Yemenis were in need of basic services, safety nets, job opportunities 
and livelihood support: there were also an estimated 3 million IDPs (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, 
p. 14). The World Bank’s Emergency Crisis Response, launched in 2016, works with UNDP and 
UNICEF, with project activities implemented through two public institutions, the Yemen Social 
Fund for Development (SFD5) and the Public Works Project (PWP) (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018).  
Complementary to humanitarian efforts, this project seeks to provide a slightly longer-term 
perspective (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 17). This includes building the resilience of the SFD 
and the PWP, so that they can reach the most vulnerable populations, and sustain and maintain 
their existing service delivery institutions for post-conflict recovery (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, 
p. 11). These two social protection institutions have a proven track-record and an ability to 
maintain political neutrality (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 11).  
Activities were scaled-up in January 2018, and again in May 2018, due to the threat of famine: 
the Emergency Cash Transfer Program was launched to target Yemen’s most vulnerable 
households and address food purchasing power constraints (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 15). 
Under this programme, cash transfers are issued to 1.5 million households in Yemen’s Social 
Welfare Fund, which had ceased operating in early 2015 due to the conflict6.  
As a multifaceted approach, the Emergency Crisis Response also includes:  
 Public works programmes (targeting 500,000 with wage labour and livelihood support, 
generating 7-8 million working days), with communities selected based on available field 
data e.g. the number of IDPs and returnees, damaged infrastructure and scarcity and 
female-headed households prioritised in the targeting process. Each targeted household 
is offered a maximum number of work-days equivalent to USD 500 (usually 50-60 days) 
and can alternate work between the adults in the house. As part of the public works 
programme vulnerable youth receive wages but also skills training in delivering health, 
education and nutrition services in their communities; 
 Increasing access to community assets (rural roads and water systems) through labour-
intensive public works; 
 Strengthening seven micro-finance institutions and 4,000 distressed micro-enterprises, 
typically farmers supported with seeds and other agricultural inputs as well as knowledge 
on sustainable farming techniques. Spill-over effects included farmers employing IDPs 
hosted in their communities and replication by farmers not in the project Al-Ahmadi & de 
Silva, 2018). 
                                                   
5 The SFD is a government institution launched in 1997 with funding from the World Bank to deliver social 
protection interventions: by 2010, 20% of its funding came from the government (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018). Al-
Iryani, de Janvry & Sadoulet (2015, p. 322) argue that although, not without its weaknesses, the SFD is resilient 
and effective at delivering aid for development because of its direct relationship with communities, political 
neutrality, a flexible mode or project funding and operation and recognition by its beneficiaries of the importance 
of its interventions. 
6 This programme was administered by the Social Welfare Fund: its cash transfer programme had been 
operational since the mid-1990s but ceased functioning in January 2015 due to the conflict. For more information 
see: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/03/21/building-resilience-and-protecting-vulnerable-
yemenis-through-cash-transfers 
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Principles guiding the programme’s design included fast disbursement arrangements to facilitate 
rapid response, prioritising the most pressing needs of the poor and conflict-affected populations, 
and ensuring political neutrality and inclusiveness (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, pp. 15-16). 
Results in the first 18 months include:  
 1.45 million households (approx. 9 million individuals) supported by cash transfers, 
women are 45% of direct recipients; 
 90% of beneficiaries reported using cash transfers for food, medicine and to repay 
household debt; 
 217,000 people benefitted from wage employment (women 30%, IDPs 20% and youth 
35%) (through the project’s labour-intensive public works initiatives); 
 More than 110,000 women and children under 5 have benefitted from nutrition-sensitive 
cash transfer; 
 Project activities reached all 333 districts despite significant security challenges  
 Project support for Village Cooperative Councils has also contributed to humanitarian 
efforts, for example, in 2016-2017, supported VCCs volunteered in implementing 1,121 
humanitarian activities for organisations including the World Food Programme (Al-
Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018).  
Project monitoring arrangements include third-party monitoring by Moore Stephens Yemen, who 
verify project results, check fiduciary aspects and satisfaction levels as well as outlining lessons 
learnt to improve project implementation (Moore Stephens, 2017). Their 2017 second quarter 
report found that 97% of surveyed beneficiaries expressed satisfaction with the project 
participatory approach and interventions. As part of Moore Stephens’ monitoring arrangements 
trained community members send daily verbal and visual feedback via mobile and cloud-based 
applications (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 27). A rapid text message-based monitoring 
mechanism to collect immediate feedback from beneficiaries on their experience with the cash 
transfer processes and use is also being piloted by programme staff (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 
2018, p. 28). 
Relevant lessons from the programme 
Al-Ahmadi & de Silva (2018, p. 23) argue that the pre-existing capacity and delivery systems of 
the SFD and PWP were instrumental in achieving rapid results for the emergency response 
programme: normally humanitarian assistance creates new emergency structures as local 
institutions are not able/capable to respond to the crisis. Consequently, they argue that building 
and investing in local capacity and national systems during peacetime enables rapid and 
scalable crisis response during conflict (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 23). Related to this, 
donor funding is critical for preserving key national service delivery institutions during conflict: in 
Yemen, the government’s ability to fund public institutions deteriorated, threatening them with 
shut down (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 31).  
Political neutrality and a transparent targeting strategy are essential to ensure buy-in from 
diverse, often opposed actors (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 25). Conflict sensitive targeting is 
important: it was important not only to focus on IDPs as part of the targeting formula, but 
returnees, communities who have experienced high levels of conflict and high levels of 
malnutrition in villages (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 35). The project also needed to be 
adaptive to conflict conditions, for example, pre-crisis social protection institutions used manual 
transactions for cash payments delivered by public sector provider, whilst during the crisis mobile 
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money has been promoted as well as delivery by commercial banks and real-time connectivity 
with payment agencies (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018, p. 34).  
5. Social safety nets examples for returnees and IDPs  
Afghanistan  
UNHCR: Voluntary Repatriation Cash Grant 
UNHCR’s Voluntary Repatriation Cash Grant targets eligible documented returnees from 
countries including Pakistan, Iran and Tajikistan (UNHCR, 2018, p. 5). It is a one-off grant 
delivered at one of four UNHCR encashment centres in Kabul, Nangarhar, Kandahar and Herat 
to address returnees’ immediate needs for food and shelter: it is not designed to support 
sustainable reintegration (UNHCR, 2018). The payment is disbursed as cash-in-hand to the head 
of the household in USD through a money service provider using the hawala system (UNHCR, 
2018). In March 2018 the grant was USD 200 per person, with average returnee family 
comprising six members: USD 50 per person is calculated to account for transport and USD 150 
to account for immediate needs (UNHCR, 2018). Encashment centres also offer a range of free 
services including polio and measles vaccinations for children and mine risk briefings (UNHCR, 
2018).  
The grant is monitored through face-to-face interviews with returnees at voluntary Repatriation 
Centres in the country of asylum and at the encashment centre on arrival and telephone call 
surveys conducted with returnees one to three months after return (UNHCR, 2018). Monitoring 
reports show 97% of the returnees spent the grant within one to two months on food, shelter and 
transportation and that host communities had a more positive view of returnees (47%), than IDPs 
(31%) (UNHCR, 2018).  
A UNHCR (2018, p. 5) case study examines the impacts on the grant on returnees from Pakistan 
between 2016 and 2017 (UNHCR, 2018, p. 5). Key findings from the case study include the limits 
of the cash grant alone in addressing some of the challenges returnees face (UNHCR, 2018, p. 
2). For example, returnees use the grant to rent a house or purchase land and build a home, 
however, poor security of tenure and quality of shelter illustrate how returnees also need access 
to technical and legal support, including advice of housing, land and property rights (UNHCR, 
2018, p. 2). The lengthy and expensive process for recognising school certificates is a barrier to 
the inclusion of returnee children in the education system (UNHCR, 2018, p. 4). This suggest 
there may be a stronger role for actors such as UNHCR and UNICEF to advocate with the 
Ministry of Education to develop a simplified process (UNHCR, 2018).  
Only a small minority of male returnees used the grant as a springboard for livelihood 
investments (UNHCR, 2018, p. 2). A lack of jobs was reported by interviewees as a key 
challenge and in some case drove further migration, including back to Pakistan (UNHCR, 2018, 
p. 2).  Solutions to overcome this problem could include engagement, support and coaching 
potential returnees in their country of asylum to capture existing skills and explore livelihood 
opportunities in return areas, and providing part of the cash grant as start-up capital for some 
returnees (UNHCR, 2018, p. 2).  
The cash grant alone is not helping returnees to avoid risks and ensure a safe return in non-
conflict-affected areas (UNCHR, 2018, p. 2). Returnees are often victims of secondary 
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displacement due to conflict in their areas of origins and become IDPs (UNHCR, 2018). A 
proportion of the returnees interviewed for the case study had originally returned to their villages 
in their rural areas of origin before moving to either Kabul or Mazar within one to three months 
due to insecurity, localised conflict and coercion and extortion practices by ‘anti-government 
elements’ (UNHCR, 2018, p. 12).  
The case study found a number of limitations with the programme’s design and operation 
including: 
 The grant does not address gender norms;  
 It is unclear how the value of the repatriation grant has been determined and it would 
benefit from redefinition and a clear strategy for future adaptions in value: in this context 
collaboration with other actors, including the Cash Voucher Working Group members and 
the IOM would be beneficial; 
 There is no consistency across returnee monitoring reports in terms of data collected and 
presentation of findings; 
 Challenges with tracing returnees, particularly in urban/peri-urban areas and areas 
outside of the government’s control: one of the reasons for this is returnees’ lack of 
access to SIM cards on arrival into Afghanistan. UNHCR has taken steps to combat the 
SIM card problem: advocacy by UNHCR has resulted in the Government agreeing that 
returnees can obtain a SIM card with a Voluntary Repatriation Form, instead of a national 
identification card (which many returnees did not have after years in exile). From March 
2018, UNHCR will facilitate the distribution of SIM cards at encashment centres, which 
include USD 2 monthly credit for a period of three months;  
 More work is needed ensure that returnees have adequate information to make the 
decision to return, including communication campaigns in countries of asylum to ensure 
potential returnees have accurate and timely security information; 
Cash transfers for IDPs and returnees 
The IOM (International Organization for Migration) supports undocumented returnees from 
Pakistan and Iran with a one-off unrestricted cash transfer, calculated and delivered to the head 
of the household at four border crossings (UNHCR, 2018, p. 8). The transfer consists of two 
components: transportation (an average of USD 25-50 per person) and USD 100 per household 
for non-food items (UNHCR, 2018, p. 8).  
ECHO (the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations) support targeted IDP 
households with cash transfers (UNHCR, 2018). Implemented by NGO partners, including the 
Norwegian Refugee Council, beneficiaries receive two cash instalments across two consecutive 
months (UNHCR, 2018. p. 7). The transfer amounts have varied across partners. However, in 
May 2018, the Afghanistan Cash and Voucher Working Group (bringing together organisations 
working in cash and voucher transfers) set a value for the multipurpose cash assistance package 
based on a calculation of the food, kitchen kits, shelter and water, sanitation and hygiene, fuel, 
health expenses and transportation needs of a 7 person conflict-affected IDP household7. The 
                                                   
7 Accessed 7 November 2018: 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/erm_8_mpc_b
asket_may_2018.pdf 
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most vulnerable households will receive two months assistance, and less vulnerable households 
will receive one month’s assistance8. Month one has a value of AFN 17,000 and month two of 
AFN 11,0009. Household vulnerability is determined by factors including the food consumption 
score, female/child/elderly headed household, and debts above AFN 800010.  
Iraq: cash transfers 
Cash transfers have been a critical part of both the humanitarian and government-led response 
to the crisis in Iraq (Smart, 2017, p. 1). Iraq’s established social transfer system, functioning 
markets in government-controlled areas and financial service providers who had maintained 
access to areas of displacement across the country provide a solid foundation for a cash-based 
response to humanitarian needs (Smart, 2017, p. 5). However, Smart (2017) argues that 
technical and contextual factors have limited the uptake of cash programming at scale and 
maximising the potential of cash transfers will require coordination and leadership and 
agreement on basic technical components of cash programming.  
Recipients of cash transfers include Syrian Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq (mainly living 
outside camps) and IDPs (there are an estimated 3 million across Iraq) (Smart, 2017, p. 5). Data 
on the volume of assistance delivered through cash and vouchers is limited (Smart, 2017, p. 7). 
Assistance includes conditional and unconditional cash transfers (e.g. in 2014, refugees received 
cash for work transfers and livelihood grants) and vouchers, paper coupons or digital credit, that 
must be spent on specific goods and services from certain vendors (Smart, 2017, p. 7, p. 9)11. By 
2016, cash-based assistance was estimated at USD 72 million (Smart, 2017, p. 9). The 2016 
Humanitarian Response Plan includes a one-off transfer of USD 360 to newly displaced 
households, with a second-line response of two additional transfers of USD 360 to the most 
vulnerable within this group and the host community (Smart, 2017, p. 1012).  
                                                   
8 Accessed 7 November 2018: 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/erm_8_mpc_b
asket_may_2018.pdf 
9 Accessed 7 November 2018: 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/erm_8_mpc_b
asket_may_2018.pdf 
10 Accessed 7 November 2018: 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/erm_8_mpc_b
asket_may_2018.pdf 
11 Between 2014 and 2016 key features of cash-based assistance included: 65% of cash transfers were 
unconditional, 5% were cash for work programmes, 5% were vouchers, 2% were conditional, 23% were 
unspecified (the project description referred to cash, but little information was given on the modality) (Smart, 
2017, p. 10). 
12 The transfer value was determined on the basis on the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket developed by 
the Cash Working Group and partners (Smart, 2017, p. 10). Agencies can reduce the amount of the transfer if 
they are aware of other assistance the household is receiving, e.g. removing the food component of the 
calculation if the household receives food assistance (Smart, 2017, p. 11). The MPCA strategy has been 
criticised for not taking into account a wider range of beneficiary groups; assistance is perceived as an 
entitlement programme, and there is duplication with cluster responses and no clear exit strategy (Smart, 2017, 
p. 11).  
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Actors implementing cash transfers include: 
 The Iraqi government through the Ministry of Displacement and Migration and the Public 
Distribution System between 2014 and 2016, provided a one-off transfer via cash or the 
QI card to displaced households that were registered with the Ministry. The programme 
ended in 2016 due to financial challenges. Humanitarian agencies criticised the 
programme for bias in registration and concerns about the transparency of the 
distribution process (Smart, 2017, p. 11).  
 UNHCR manages a cash transfer programme including nearly 15,000 refugee families 
with multipurpose cash grants. They have piloted bank transfers, mobile money and an 
Iraqi Smart Card System (the QI card) (Smart, 2017, p. 9).  
 WFP has progressively shifted from direct food aid to the provision of cash or vouchers. 
In 2015, it began providing unconditional cash transfers and vouchers in its IDP response 
and in 2016, it introduced the WFP SCOPE Card, a smart card distributed to money 
transfer companies. By, the end of 2016, WFP was reaching 550,000 IDPs across Iraq 
with a monthly cash transfer (Smart, 2017, p. 10). It is the largest cash transfer provider 
in Iraq (Smart, 2017, p. 12).  
Challenges in government and international community support for transfers 
At the national level, the Iraqi government accepted the operation of humanitarian cash transfer 
programmes with the caveat that they do not duplicate the government-led cash response 
(Smart, 2017). However, Smart (2017, p. 5) argues that there appears to be no means to 
effectively coordinate or verify beneficiaries to avoid duplication: given the lack of information 
about who had received government transfers, humanitarian agencies relied on beneficiary self-
reporting. As there is little incentive to self-report, it is likely there was duplication of transfers 
(Smart, 2017, p. 13). There is also tension around targeting between the government and 
humanitarian agencies: Iraq’s longest-running social transfer system, the PDS, is not means 
tested and is provided to all Iraqis, in contrast, humanitarian transfers are heavily targeted 
(Smart, 2017). The government’s fiscal crisis also means that transitioning the humanitarian 
social protection caseload to government-led social protection systems is not feasible (Smart, 
2017 pp. 13-14).  
Humanitarian inter-agency politics and problems with inter-agency collaboration including 
discussions over where cash sits within the humanitarian system and agreement on basic 
principles and areas for action, have complicated efforts to use cash effectively and at scale 
(Smart, 2017, pp. 5-6). For example, the Cash Working Group (CWG), established in 2014 under 
the leadership of the UNHCR and Mercy Corps, developed a Survival Minimum Expenditure 
Basket to standardise transfer values for multipurpose cash assistance (unconditional and 
unrestricted transfers designed to address a range of needs) (Smart, 2017). However, it is not 
used by UNHCR (who calculate based on household size) and WFP (basket of food goods 
calculated by its Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping unit) (Smart, 2017, p. 12).  
Different transfer values means it can be unclear to beneficiaries, communities and government 
officials why different individuals receive different amounts (Smart, 2017, p. 12). Agencies also 
have different information management platforms linked to different delivery mechanisms (Smart, 
2017, p. 15). Use of multiple platforms is inefficient and donors to Iraq have highlighted the need 
to adopt a single system to manage and track cash transfers (Smart, 2017, p. 15).  There is likely 
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to be significant under-reporting as data on cash programmes has not been systematically 
uploaded to the OCHA’s reporting system or the in-country reporting system (Smart, 2017, p. 9).  
A lack of effective financial service providers capable of physically delivering cash assistance 
means agencies have had to rely on money transfer companies, including the more informal 
hawala network (Smart, 2017). For example, this network is responsible for the physical 
distribution of cash in WFP’s cash transfer programme (Smart, 2017, p. 12). The limited 
availability of an effective electronic transfer is a key challenge in using cash assistance at scale 
(Smart, 2017).  
Sudan 
Sudan has suffered from continuous armed conflict, particularly in Darfur, South Kordofan and 
the Blue Nile states (Machado, Bilo, Soares & Osorio, 2018, p. 278). Social protection 
programmes target IDPs (estimated at 1.98 million in November 2017), returnees (estimated at 
386,000 in November 2017) and refugees (approximately 2 million across Sudan) (UNOCHA, 
2018). The UN estimates that a further 500,000 displaced people live in host communities and 
settlements in Darfur: only IDPs who live in camps are registered (UNOCHA, 2018). It is not 
possible to access conflict-affected populations and IDPs in non-government controlled areas 
(UNOCHA, 2018).  
IDPs and returnees often have particular needs (UNOCHA, 2018). For example, returnees often 
need support to settle in their former places of origin, either as temporary humanitarian 
assistance until their traditional livelihoods are restored, or in terms of available public services 
(UNOCHA, 2018). Internally displaced children need school feeding programmes (UNOCHA, 
2018).  
Sudan has a number of government-led social protection programmes, but spending on social 
assistance is low: 0.6% of GDP in 2015 (Machado et al., 2018, p. 278). Ministry of Security and 
Social Development is responsible for implementing social protection policies, with 18 poverty 
reduction centres are responsible for implementation at the local level (Machado et al., 2018, p. 
278). For example, Shamel provides unconditional cash and in-kind transfers, water services, 
housing and nutritional support including school feeding programmes to Sudan’s poorest 
households in 9 states with plans to roll-out to all 18 (Machado et al., 2018, p. 279). Other 
programmes include the Zakat Fund, which provides cash transfers, subsidies, services and 
productive support as well as education fee waivers and student support grants to students from 
poor households to pursue higher education. The fund operates as a semi-autonomous agency 
affiliated to the Ministry of Security and Social Development and in 2016 it reached 2.16 million 
households (Machado et al., 2018, p. 279). No information could be found about whether these 
government-led social protection programmes include returnees or IDPs, however, information 
on humanitarian support from international organisations was easy to locate.  
Cash transfers  
The World Food Programme, with support from UKaid, supports IDPs in the Otash camp in 
Darfur13. In 2016, WFP transitioned to cash based transfers in the camp, as opposed to 
                                                   
13 Accessed 7 November 2018: https://insight.wfp.org/from-displacement-to-business-opportunities-wfp-sudans-
cash-transfer-programme-18caf660c559 
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vouchers, which has given recipients freedom of choice and generates income and the 
influences the economic growth of the local market: small-traders in the camp purchase goods 
from the local town market and sell them in the camp, generating an income for their families14. 
Other elements of WFP’s work in Sudan include: 
 School feeding programme for 28,000 students in South Kordofan State displaced from 
their areas of origin due to conflict15; 
 Food assistance, delivered by the Sudanese Red Crescent and other NGO partners; 
 A beneficiary Complaints and Feedback Mechanism call-centre in North Darfur: by 
September 2018, it had received 205 complaints, 78% of calls were related to cash 
assistance activities (particularly cash cards), 97% of the queries were placed by female 
callers, in response WFP is hiring female operators; 
 A pilot hydroponics project to improve the livelihoods of displaced people in Beliel Camp, 
Nyala in conjunction with FAO who will train beneficiaries; 
 Heavy rains and floods pose a critical challenge to operations as they block road access 
and delay assessments and distributions; 
 The drawdown of the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur has resulted in WFP 
prioritising areas that do not need an armed escort to access (WFP, 2018b).  
Syria 
Syria had a number of pre-crisis government-led social protection systems, which functioned to 
varying degrees (Machado, Bilo, Soares & Osorio, 2018, p. 290). These included a contributory 
pension scheme, a 2011 programme, the National Social Aid Fund (cash-transfers for low-
income families) which was discontinued after public uprisings, and cash transfers for people 
with disabilities (Machado et al., 2018, p. 290). Most state-run programmes have now been 
suspended (Machado et al., 2018, p. 291).  
Machado et al. (2018, p. 291) argue that it is vital to work towards reactivating pre-crisis schemes 
and integrate humanitarian cash transfers programmes into existing social services to guarantee 
a smooth transition to public ownership once conditions allow. Their report indicates that 
negotiations and discussions are taking place with senior government officials to restructure the 
support provided, adjust the programme to the post-crisis situation and reactivate it: however, no 
further information could be found on this.  
Cash transfers 
In 2016, UNICEF introduced a cash transfer programme to support families with children with 
complex disabilities (Machado et al., 2018, p. 290). This scheme also includes case 
management by social workers hired through NGOs in coordination with the Departments of 
Social Affairs and Labour (Machado et al., 2018, p. 296). Initial activities focused on Aleppo, but 
it has since been rolled out to other areas and reaches 9,000 families with cash transfers of USD 
                                                   
14 Accessed 7 November 2018: https://insight.wfp.org/from-displacement-to-business-opportunities-wfp-sudans-
cash-transfer-programme-18caf660c559 
15 Accessed 7 November 2018: https://insight.wfp.org/more-than-just-a-meal-sudans-school-lunches-
4aed4f6fabd 
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80 every two months: this includes families who have been displaced and are living in temporary 
accommodation16. Displacement is also a barrier to children with disabilities’ education as it 
prevents access to special schools: cash transfers can be used to pay for transport to school17. 
Geographical locations for the project are selected on the basis on identified vulnerabilities in the 
early livelihood and recovery sector, high percentage of displaced people, relatively stable 
operating environment and assessed presence of NGOs that could act as implementing partners 
(Machado et al., 2018, p. 296).  
UNICEF’s facts and figures for the first quarter of 2018 shows that against a target of reaching 
12,200 families with regular cash transfers between January and March 2018, only 1,500 were 
reached18. No explanation for this could be found during the timeframe of this review.  
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